

EU Spending for the migration/refugee crisis: Value for Money or Money Show?

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
**JEAN MONNET CHAIR
EU BUDGETARY GOVERNANCE
AND AUDIT**

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Budgetary Data

- The **resources from the EU Budget**, aiming at meeting the increased migratory challenges for the **period 2015-2018**, have been **more than doubled** to €22 billion from the original allocation of €9.6 billion.



EU funding inside and outside the EU for the period 2015-2018

Planned funding inside the EU

AMIF (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund), ISF (Internal Security Fund) and Emergency Support Instrument	€8.2 bn
<i>Emergency funding</i>	€1.8 bn
<i>Long-term measures</i>	€6.4 bn
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Support to agencies and their operations	€1.4 bn
TOTAL	€9.6 bn

Planned funding outside the EU



Humanitarian aid ¹	€3.5 bn
Support to border and migration management in Turkey and the Western Balkans	€0.3 bn
Support to livelihood opportunities, health, education for refugees and mobility policy	€0.8 bn
Return of refugees and displaced persons, aid and support to migrants, fight against root causes of migration ²	€1.6 bn
Support to stabilisation and peace, security and border management of third countries	€0.4 bn
Trust Fund for Syria (MADAD Fund) ³	€0.6 bn
Pledges from the London Conference in February 2016 and the Brussels Conference in April 2017 supporting the future of Syria and the region ⁴	€1.6 bn
EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa ⁵	€2.6 bn
Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) ⁶	€1.0 bn
TOTAL	€12.4 bn

EU Financial Support to Greece for managing the migration crisis

- Two main sources of funding:
- The **Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)** which promotes the efficient management of migration flows and the implementation, strengthening and development of a common EU approach to asylum and immigration.
- The **Internal Security Fund (ISF)** which promotes the implementation of the Internal Security Strategy, law enforcement cooperation and the management of the Union's external borders. The ISF is composed of two instruments, ISF Borders and Visa and ISF Police.



Long-term funding to Greece (allocations) 2014 - 2020



Emergency Funding (allocated)

€139.1m

AMIF Emergency Assistance directly allocated to Greek authorities

€55.8m

ISF Emergency Assistance directly allocated to Greek authorities

€197.4m

Emergency Assistance allocated to International Organisations/Union Agencies (IOM, UNHCR, EASO)
Source: AMIF and ISF


The first audit: 2012 - Migrants' integration

- Migration has been on the EU's agenda for a long time. The main concern was, initially, the integration of the migrants in EU society, as their numbers at the time were deemed tolerable.
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- Thus, **before the eruption of the migration/refugee crisis** in 2015, the European Court of Auditors examined, in its **Special Report 22/2012**, whether two instruments of the General Programme on Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows for the period 2007–13 (known as SOLID), ie **the European Integration Fund and the European Refugee Fund** contribute effectively to the integration of third-country nationals. It found that that **it was not possible for the Commission or Member States to assess the contribution of the funds to integration** because the Member States **did not set proper targets or indicators** for their annual programmes, and the relevant reports did not provide enough information for the Funds to be evaluated or steered. At the level of individual projects, **the sample under audit showed positive results but these could not be linked to success at a higher level**, not least because **the implementation rate was low in the 2007 and 2008** national annual programmes and later programmes were not yet been completed.
- The effectiveness of the Funds has been **hampered by the design of the programmes, which were fragmented, burdensome and inadequately coordinated with other EU funds**. The **splitting of funding for target groups** which had similar needs created problems for authorities and beneficiaries, as **it caused the establishment of multiple chains of fund management and controls**, thus leading to excessive administration, out of proportion to the size of the funds involved. The insufficient coherence and complementarity with other EU funds caused **overlaps**, missed opportunities for synergy and **risks of double-funding**. The relevant **legislation was delayed** significantly thus causing further delays to the submission of programmes, the establishment of implementing rules and the provision of guidance.


SOLID PROGRAMME FUNDS, 2007–13

Financial instrument	Implementation	EU funds (million euro)
European Integration Fund (EIF)	2007–13	830
European Refugee Fund (ERF)	2008–13	623
External Borders Fund (EBF)	2007–13	1 908
European Return Fund (RF)	2008–13	681
Total		4 043

FOREIGN RESIDENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2010



EIF BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION



* 2008 reports not submitted

** 2007 and 2008 reports not submitted

2016 – External Dimension of EU migration policy

- The external dimension of the EU's common migration policy **aims to promote effective management of migration flows in partnership with countries of origin and transit**. The ECA's **Special Report 9/2016** examined the two main financing instruments in 6 out of the 11 Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership countries, the Thematic Programme for Migration and Asylum (TPMA), and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), established for the 2007-2013 period. Again the ECA **did not examine the developments in migration after 2014**.
- The EU's external migration spending was governed by a **wide range of general objectives**. The total **amount of expenditure charged to the EU budget could not be established** in the course of the audit. Also, it was **not clear whether expenditure had been directed in line with the intended geographical and thematic priorities**.
- It was found that **the effectiveness** of the EU's external migration spending (TPMA and ENPI) in the Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership countries **can be improved**. It was often **difficult to measure the results achieved by EU spending** because of objectives covering a very broad thematic and geographical area and the **lack of quantitative and results-oriented indicators**. The **contribution of migration to development**, which is one of the priorities of the global approach to migration and mobility (GAMM), **was difficult to assess**. Finally, **the contribution made by migrants returning to their home country was limited**.

- The EU's external migration spending was **implemented by a wide range of stakeholders**. It **necessitated coordination** between the Commission's various departments, in particular its directorates-general, the European External Action Service, EU delegations in non-EU countries and a number of EU agencies, in partnership with Member States, neighbourhood countries and third countries. This **complex governance required stronger coordination**, at all levels, and better involvement of EU delegations in migration issues.
- The ECA recommended that the Commission should **develop clear and measurable objectives to be implemented** by a coherent set of EU funding instruments supported by effective monitoring and evaluation, and by an appropriate information system. **Governance arrangements must be simpler and better coordinated**.

Amounts committed, contracted and paid in the external dimension of migration policy during the 2007-2013 period (million euro)

	Budget commitments	Contracts by value	Number of contracts	Payments
TPMA	379.78	375	256	304.30
ENPI		376	64	
DCI (excl. TPMA)		190	64	
EDF		156	27	
EIDHR		7	43	
IFS		5	4	
IPA		309	76	
TOTAL		1 418	534	304.30
Data not available				

TPMA: Thematic Programme for Migration and Asylum
ENPI: European Neighbourhood (and Partnership) Instrument
DCI: Development Cooperation Instrument
EDF: European Development Fund
EIDHR: European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
IFS: Instrument for Stability
IPA: Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

Mobility partnerships signed between the EU, EU Member States and non-EU countries

	Cape Verde	Moldova	Georgia	Armenia	Morocco	Azerbaijan	Tunisia	Jordan	
Date	2008	2008	2009	2011	2013	2013	2013	2014	
EU	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	8
France	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	8
Germany		X	X	X	X		X	X	6
Italy		X	X	X	X		X	X	6
Poland		X	X	X		X	X	X	6
Sweden		X	X	X	X		X	X	6
Belgium			X	X	X		X		4
Bulgaria		X	X	X		X			4
Czech Republic		X	X	X		X			4
Netherlands			X	X	X	X			4
Portugal	X	X			X		X		4
Romania		X	X	X				X	4
Spain	X				X		X	X	4
Denmark			X				X	X	3
Greece		X	X					X	3
Lithuania		X	X			X			3
United Kingdom			X		X		X		3
Cyprus		X						X	2
Hungary		X						X	2
Slovakia		X				X			2
Slovenia		X				X			2
Estonia			X						1
Latvia			X						1
Luxembourg	X								1
Austria									0
Croatia									0
Finland									0
Ireland									0
Malta									0
Total Member States	4	15	16	10	9	8	10	11	

Mobility Partnerships are the main instrument of EU Neighbourhood Policy - Participation is voluntary

Source: ECA Special Report 9/2016

2017 – The “hot-spot approach”

- The **first integrated audit** by the European Court of Auditors regarding the EU actions **about the refugee crisis** focused on the so called “hotspot approach”, in **Special Report 6/2017**.
- The audit included the countries in which the hotspots were established, i.e. **Greece and Italy**. The aim of the hotspot approach was to provide operational support to Member States to ensure arriving migrants were identified, registered and fingerprinted, and channeled into the relevant follow-up procedures. Overall, it was found that **this approach has helped to improve migration management** in the two Member States, under very challenging and constantly changing circumstances, by increasing their reception capacities, improving registration procedures, and by strengthening the coordination of support efforts.
- The selection of the hotspot locations took into account the main entry points and the availability of existing structures. However, **setting them up took longer than planned** and the **reception facilities in both countries were not yet adequate** to properly receive (Italy) or accommodate (Greece) the number of migrants arriving, while for accommodating and processing unaccompanied minors **the facilities did not meet international standards**.
- The European Commission and the relevant EU Agencies supported the efforts of the two Member States by providing experts, financial and technical resources, advice and coordination. The Agencies’ capacity to provide such support was and remains very dependent on the resources offered by Member States. Additionally, **the duration of expert deployments was often very short, thereby reducing the efficiency of the deployed experts**. The new mandates for the Agencies (for instance for FRONTEX) aim at addressing these shortfalls.

- Furthermore, although standard operating procedures are an essential element for clarifying responsibilities and harmonising procedures, in particular where numerous different players are involved, as is the case for the current hotspot approach, **only Italy has established hotspot standard operating procedures and applies them both in the hotspots and in other disembarkation ports** functioning as hotspots, while in Greece, their adoption is still pending. **Coordination at the individual hotspot level is still fragmented** and although it has been established that the central authorities in the two Member States are responsible for the overall management of the hotspots, at least in Greece, they have yet to take on this responsibility in full. Monitoring and reporting by the European Commission on the progress and problems at the hotspots has been regular and extensive.
- In both countries, **the hotspot approach ensured** that most of the arriving **migrants were properly identified, registered and fingerprinted and that their data were checked** against relevant security databases. In this respect, the hotspot approach contributed towards an improved management of the migration flows. The hotspot approach further requires that migrants be channeled into appropriate follow-up procedures, i.e. a national asylum application, relocation to another Member State (where appropriate) or return to the country of origin (or transit). **Implementation of these follow-up procedures is often slow and subject to various bottlenecks**, which can have repercussions on the functioning of the hotspots.
- The European Court of Auditors recommended to the European Commission to **assist the Member States in improving the hotspot approach** as regards **hotspot capacity, the treatment of unaccompanied minors, the deployment of experts and roles and responsibilities in the hotspot approach**.

Figure 5 – Map with location of Italian and Greek hotspots and their respective capacities¹



¹ For Italy, the six originally proposed hotspot locations are shown, two of which (Augustia and Porto Empedocle) were not made hotspots.


Source: ECA Special Report 6/2017


Figure 6 – EU financial support (in million euro)

Programmes	GREECE		ITALY	
	Awarded	Disbursed	Awarded	Disbursed
AMIF	585	247	365	55
AMIF National Programmes 2014-2020		295	45	348
AMIF Emergency Assistance to MS	126	101	16	10
AMIF Emergency Assistance to IO/EU Agencies	165	101	1	1
ISF	277	75	291	36
ISF National Programmes 2014-2020		215	26	245
ISF Emergency Assistance to MS		52	42	7
ISF Emergency Assistance to IO/EU Agencies		10	7	0
Emergency Support instrument (contracted)	192	127	0	0
TOTAL	1 055	448	656	91

Figure 7 - Sea arrivals to the Greek islands

Number of arrivals 1.10.2015 – 1.1.2017





2018 – The Refugee Facility in Turkey

- The Facility for Refugees in Turkey, established on 1 January 2016, is the EU response to the European Council's call for significant additional funding to support refugees in Turkey. It is a **mechanism for coordinating and streamlining an amount of €3 billion** from the EU (€1 billion) and its Member States (€2 billion). The support **covers humanitarian and non-humanitarian activities**, with a financial allocation of €1.4 billion and €1.6 billion respectively. The Facility **aims to enhance the efficiency and complementarity of support provided to refugees and host communities** in Turkey. The ECA's auditing results on this scheme are included in its **Special Report 27/2018**.
- The Facility for Refugees in Turkey **rapidly mobilised its resources** to provide a swift response to the refugee crisis. Nevertheless, **it did not fully achieve its objective** of coordinating this response effectively. **The audited projects provided helpful support to refugees; most of them have achieved their outputs, but half of them have not yet achieved their expected outcomes and nine out of ten had to be extended.** The Facility **helped refugees to address their basic needs, but did not always deliver the expected value for money.**
- The Commission identified the priority needs of refugees based on a comprehensive needs assessment. However, **disagreements between Turkey and the EU on how to address the priority needs** in municipal infrastructure and socio-economic support resulted in these areas being insufficiently covered.
- The Facility supported similar type of activities in the health and education sectors through different instruments. This made **coordination more complex and resulted in the parallel use of different management structures to fund similar projects.**

- As for the efficiency of the **humanitarian projects** funded by the Facility, it was found that **the Commission did not consistently and comprehensively assess the reasonableness of the budgeted costs**. Also even if they were in line with the legal framework, **the indirect costs paid to the partners implementing large cash-assistance projects were high**, and **the level of advance payments was not aligned with the actual cash outflows** of the projects.
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- The Commission put in place appropriate measures to monitor humanitarian projects. The main **limitation was the Turkish authorities' refusal to grant access to beneficiary data for the two cash-assistance projects**. In fact, **neither the Commission nor the ECA was able to track the project beneficiaries from their registration to the payment**.
-
- The Facility's results framework, was still under development: **baselines, milestones or quantified targets for high-level indicators had not yet been completed**. Public reporting was **limited** and its scope did not capture the whole EU assistance to refugees in Turkey.
- The ECA provided **recommendations** aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the second tranche of the Facility's budget, focusing **on addressing more properly the refugees' needs** for municipal infrastructure and socio-economic support, **improving the streamlining and the complementarity** of assistance, adopting and implementing a **strategy for the transition from humanitarian to development assistance**, addressing with the Turkish authorities the **need to improve the operating environment for (I)NGOs**, and enhancing the monitoring and reporting of the Facility.
- It should be noted that under the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, **a second installment of €3 billion for the Refugee Facility was provided, before the €3 billion initially allocated has been fully used up**. This was a political but premature choice, as **no evidence of the resources' efficient and effective use had been provided**. The ECA's findings necessitate the improvement of the overall scheme.

Map 1 – Breakdown of refugees and asylum-seekers by province in Turkey as of June 2018






Figure 2 – Scale-up of EU humanitarian assistance in Turkey 2015-2017 (based on budgeted EU humanitarian assistance for man-made crises)




Source: ECA Special Report 27/2018

Figure 1 – Proportion of the Facility's assistance allocated to each priority area (based on contracted amounts)



Source: ECA Special Report 27/2018

Contracting speed of the Facility compared to EU Trust Funds (in million euro)



The EU-Turkey Statement (“Agreement”)

- On 18 March 2016, EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey agreed on the **EU-Turkey Statement to end the flow of irregular migration from Turkey to the EU and replace it with organised, safe and legal channels to Europe.**
- **Core principle of the EU-Turkey Statement:** All new irregular migrants or asylum seekers crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey, after an individual assessment of their asylum claims in line with EU and international law, **Turkey being considered a “safe country” under international humanitarian law.** For every Syrian being returned to Turkey, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU from Turkey directly (**1:1 mechanism**). In parallel, the **EU will make available significant resources under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey to support refugees in Turkey (see above), it will re-examine the visa regime for Turkish nationals to enter the EU, it will upgrade the EU-Turkey customs union, and it will open Chapter 33 (budget) of the negotiations on Turkey’s accession in the EU.**
- Everyone who applies for asylum in Greece has his/her **application treated on a case-by-case basis**, in line with EU and international law requirements and the **principle of non-refoulement**. In each case there are **individual interviews, individual assessments** and rights of appeal. There are **no blanket or automatic returns** of migrants or asylum seekers.
- **Critical Development:** On 28 February 2017 the ECJ, adjudicating on the actions of three immigrants against the EU-Turkey Agreement, found (Cases **T-192/16, T-193/16 & T-257/16**) that this agreement, despite its expressed wording (“... *the EU and Turkey today decided to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. In order to achieve this goal, they agreed on the following additional action points...*”), was actually a Statement **that it is was not part of EU Law, but a simple international law agreement, which imposes no obligations on the EU itself but only on its Member States and Turkey.** Thus any violation of this agreement’s terms must be examined by the national courts or the International Court of Justice.

ARRIVALS ON THE ISLANDS IN 2015


October 2015:
Daily average
6,360 arrivals

December 2015:
Daily average
3,222 arrivals


ARRIVALS ON THE ISLANDS SINCE THE EU-TURKEY STATEMENT

Since 21 March 2016:
Daily average
80 arrivals

Drop of
97%



Resettlements under the EU-Turkey Statement are continuing at a steady pace – in total, over 12,476 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to EU Member States so far.



The Commission and the EU Member States are providing significant support to the Greek authorities in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, to improve migration management and reception conditions in Greece. EU actions focus in particular on helping to alleviate the situation on the Greek islands.

	The year before the EU Turkey Statement	Two years after the EU Turkey Statement
Registration rate at hotspots	8% in October 2015	100%
Reception capacity in Greece (on the islands)	2000 in October 2015	49,349 (of which 9,163 in the hotspots and other structures)
Capacity of Greek asylum service staff on the islands	16	Total asylum service staff on the islands: 365 (including 110 EASO experts)
First instance decisions on asylum applications on the islands	0	40,008
Returns of irregular migrants to Turkey	627	2,164
Relocations	569	21,847
Arrivals	988,703	57,450
Loss of lives	1,145	130
EU Agency support for Greece		EASO experts: 135 European Border and Coast Guard officers: 801

2018 - ECA Briefing Note on Migrants' Integration

- **After the eruption of the refugee crisis**, in a briefing note on the integration of migrants outside the EU, dated **17.5.2018**, the European Court of Auditors, after collecting an variety of data on relevant actions, has identified the following challenges:
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- **Challenge 1: Reducing delays in the start of integration**
- The earlier integration starts, the more likely it is to be successful. Factors that delay the start to the integration process (such as when migrants move on to another EU Member State because of, for example, divergences in national rules regarding entry and residence conditions, or long waiting periods to process applications) may affect the effective integration of migrants into society
- **Challenge 2: Guaranteeing equal rights and non-discrimination**
- Equal rights and non-discrimination are important factors in helping migrants integrate successfully. Ineffective anti-discrimination policies towards migrants might hinder their successful integration into society.
- **Challenge 3: Sound and comprehensive assessment of needs and funding**
- Integration policies require a sound and comprehensive assessment of migrant and host society needs and funded by adequate resources made available when needed. However, even now, the exact overall amount of the resources provided for this objective is not known. Without a robust estimate of the funding needed at national level and how EU funding can complement national interventions, there is a risk that policies might be ineffective.

- **Challenge 4: Commitment of Member States to implement the Action Plan**

- In 2016, the European Commission developed an Action Plan on integration with 52 measures to be undertaken at EU level. As of December 2017, 23 actions had not been completed. The effective implementation of Action Plan measures relating to Member States depends on their commitment. The lack of monitoring of these measures by the Commission may limit its ability to provide additional support to Member States.

- **Challenge 5: Supporting all migrants across all relevant policy areas**

- Most Member States have established integration policies in various frameworks. However, such integration policies at national level require a comprehensive framework to support all migrants across all relevant policy areas. Integration policies that do not address all relevant policy areas for all groups of migrants may lead to less effective integration.

- **Challenge 6: Effective monitoring of integration outcomes to measure progress and adapt policies if needed**

- Most Member States still do not have a complete picture on the number of migrants receiving assistance or the amounts spent for integration actions. Monitoring integration outcomes allows stakeholders to measure the progress in the implementation of integration policies, identify limitations and adapt policies if needed. Lack of good data or inappropriate monitoring may prevent measures from being redirected and/ or policies from being redesigned to address the real needs of migrants.

- **Challenge 7: Effective coordination of funding at EU and national level**

- It has been established that actions of the same type, focusing on the same target group, may be financed by several EU financial instruments. Without effective coordination at EU and national level, there is the risk that the complexity of funding arrangements may lead to inefficient policy implementation (less complementarity, fewer synergies, difficulties in accessing funds, risk of double funding).

Figure 1 - In 2017, about 4 % of EU population were legally residing migrants from outside the EU



Figure 3 - First time asylum applications tripled during 2014-2017 while protection was granted to less than half






Figure 5 - Common Basic Principles for the integration of migrants



Number of migrants in the Member States and its percentage in the population (2017)



2018 – The EU Trust Fund for Africa

- Since January 2013, the European Commission was allowed to create and administer European Union trust funds for external actions. These are **multi-donor trust funds for emergency, post-emergency or thematic actions**. The European Union Emergency trust fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (the ‘EUTF for Africa’) is **aimed at fostering stability and helping to better manage migration by addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration**. It was agreed at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015. It supports activities in 26 countries across **three regions of Africa (referred to as ‘windows’)**: the Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North of Africa.
- The ECA examined the design and implementation of the EUTF for Africa in its **Special Report 32/2018**, its most recent report on migration issues. The EUTF for Africa was found to be a **flexible tool**, with an **overall fast rate** of launching projects, signing of contracts and making advance payments. However, **projects face similar challenges as traditional instruments that delay their implementation**.
- The **objectives** of the EUTF for Africa **are broad**. This has **allowed flexibility** in terms of adapting the support to suit different and changing situations, **but is less useful when it comes to steering action** across the three windows **and for measuring impact**. The **needs to be addressed by the Trust Fund were not comprehensively analysed and quantified, nor the means at its disposal**. The **strategic guidance provided has not been specific enough**, and the pooling of resources and capacities of donors is not yet sufficiently effective.
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- The **procedures for selecting projects varied between the windows** and that **the criteria for assessing project proposals were not sufficiently clear or documented**.


- While the EUTF for Africa has adopted a common monitoring system, it is not yet operational and the three windows use different systems for monitoring performance. Project objectives were often not SMART and the indicators used for measuring project performance lacked baselines.
- The EUTF for Africa has contributed to the effort of decreasing the number of irregular migrants passing from Africa to Europe, but this contribution cannot be measured precisely.
- The ECA's recommendations focused on improving the quality of the objectives of the EUTF for Africa, revising the selection procedure for projects, taking measures to speed up implementation, and improving the monitoring of the EUTF for Africa.

Figure 3 – Indicative comparison of speed of procedures

Phase	Definition	EUTF for Africa, all windows (in days)	EU Budget and EDF (in days)	Time saved on average (in days)
1. Identification/formulation	Average number of days between Quality Support Group and approval by OpComs or EDF/DCI Committee	33	133	100
2. Contracting	Average number of days between approval by OpComs or EDF/ENI/DCI Committee, and contract signature	270	423	153
3. First payment	Average number of days between signature of contract and authorisation of first payment	30	42	12

Figure 1 – Countries covered by the EUTF for Africa

(The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the European Union)



EU MS and other donors contributions (pledged and received contributions) as of 31 August 2018

The countries that have pledged contributions of at least €3 million, securing voting rights in the Trust Fund Board and the OpComs, are highlighted in grey.

Country	Contributions pledged (euro)	Contributions received (euro)
Austria	6 000 000	6 000 000
Belgium	10 000 000	9 000 000
Bulgaria	550 000	550 000
Croatia	600 000	600 000
Cyprus	100 000	100 000
Czech Republic*	10 411 624	10 411 124
Denmark	20 045 876	20 045 876
Estonia	1 450 000	1 450 000
Finland	5 000 000	5 000 000
France	9 000 000	9 000 000
Germany	157 500 000	139 500 000
Hungary*	9 450 000	9 450 000
Ireland	15 000 000	2 600 000
Italy	110 000 000	108 000 000
Latvia	300 000	300 000
Lithuania	200 000	200 000
Luxembourg	3 100 000	3 100 000
Malta	325 000	175 000
Netherlands	26 362 000	23 362 000
Norway	8 865 381	8 865 381
Poland*	10 550 748	10 550 748
Portugal	1 800 000	1 800 000
Romania	100 000	100 000
Slovakia*	10 350 000	10 350 000
Slovenia	100 000	100 000
Spain	9 000 000	9 000 000
Sweden	3 000 000	3 000 000
Switzerland	4 100 000	4 100 000
United Kingdom	6 000 000	2 800 000
Visegrád group (CZ, HU, PL, SK)*	35 000 000	35 000 000
Total External Contribution	439 260 629	409 510 629


Figure 5 - Illegal border crossings of migrants into the EU, originating from the regions covered by the EUTF for Africa

	2014	2015	2016	2017
Sahel and Lake Chad	42 601	65 297	114 814	76 889
North of Africa	10 773	21 603	19 393	27 912
Horn of Africa	46 536	70 875	42 850	17 984
Total EUTF for Africa	99 910	157 775	177 057	122 785

Source: ECA Special Report 32/2018

2019 - Overall assessment

- The **European Parliament has endorsed the ECA's conclusions** in all these reports, but asked the ECA to “*consider a quick follow-up report on the functioning of the hotspots, adopting a broader scope by including also an analysis of the follow-up procedures, i.e. the asylum, relocation and return procedures*”. This report has been scheduled for 2019.
- **State of play:**
- While the numbers of migrants have been reduced significantly, the **national asylum systems are still facing a large number of pending asylum claims. Italian and Greek authorities have a heavy backlog to clear.**
- Another difficulty is that **many irregular migrants leave their country of first entry to apply for asylum in another Member State.** These secondary movements make it difficult to implement the Dublin mechanism.
- As regards the **temporary distribution schemes**, their **initial aim was to relocate 160,000** eligible migrants from Greece and Italy to other Member States. This figure was **later reduced to 98,255** at the request of Member States. However, as **at 31 October 2018, only 34,705** asylum seekers had been relocated: **12,706 from Italy and 21 999 from Greece.**
- On the subject of **returns**, the actual rate of return of non-EU nationals ordered to leave the territory was **around 36% in 2017.** According to the Commission, the overall efficiency of return procedures has suffered as a result of Member States’ “*inefficient and inconsistent application of the relevant Directive*”.




Irregular arrivals in the Mediterranean (yearly evolution).

Source: Council of the EU, based on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) data (*latest estimate for the whole year 2018 is 136.000).

Rate of returns in the EU


Source: ECA based on Commission's data.



The 2021-2027 MFF

- In its Conclusions on 28 June 2018, the European Council, identified **the necessity of a comprehensive approach to migration** aiming at **preventing a return to the uncontrolled flows of 2015 and to further stem illegal migration on all existing and emerging routes** (Eastern, Central and Western Mediterranean).
- In this framework, a **new approach** is being introduced, **in order to eliminate the incentive to embark on perilous journeys in the Mediterranean**: the concept of **regional disembarkation platforms** which should operate distinguishing individual situations, in full respect of international law and without creating a pull factor. On EU territory, those who are saved, will be transferred in controlled centres set up (only on a voluntary basis) in Member States, where rapid and secure processing would allow, with full EU support, **to distinguish between irregular migrants, who will be returned, and those in need of international protection, for whom the principle of solidarity would apply**. In this scheme the African countries are expected to play a critical role.
- Consequently, **providing supporting to the African countries** in their efforts to achieve a substantial socio-economic **transformation of the African continent** building upon the principles and objectives as defined by the African countries in their Agenda 2063, has been identified as a major tool in tackling the migration problem. **Additional development funding is to be provided**, as well as support for enabling a substantial increase of private investment from both Africans and Europeans, in fields such as education, health, infrastructure, innovation, good governance and women's empowerment.

Within this approach, the EU budget for the management of external borders, migration and asylum will be significantly reinforced, overall, for the period 2021-2027, reaching more than €34.9 billion, compared to €13 billion for the period 2014-2020.




- European Asylum Support Office (EASO)
- euLISA (*)
- European Border and Coast Guard Agency
- Border Management, incl. Customs Equipment
- Asylum and Migration

(*) European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice


Source: European Commission
 Note: Compared to the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 at EU-27

Annex II: Commission's proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF — Proposed changes to the EU 7-year budget


Structure and headings



Priority areas: big increases in smaller headings



Additional funds for priority areas



Source: ECA, based on Commission data.

Reflections

- **Using the resources of the EU Budget** has been the main instrument available to the European Commission in order to formulate and implement policies during the period of the migration crisis.
- The sense of “emergency” which prevailed at the time allowed for **a re-organization and re-prioritization of the EU Budget’s appropriations** and of the aims of the funding tools, something which has been emphatically expressed with the establishment of schemes such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey.
- The European Commission’s persistence in committed appropriations is seen as **an effort to cover the gaps created by its reduced competences in this field, or by the difficulties it encountered** when it tried to exercise the additional competences it acquired during the crisis, especially with regard to border management and to asylum and migration policies. **The capability of providing funding replaces the inability to take legal or political action.**
- Furthermore, all these **funding activities have been a useful and critical tool in terms of communicating information** in order to reassure the national authorities as well as the peoples of the Member States that the EU has been mobilized in order to tackle the problem. This symbolic function of funding activities justifies also the fact that the European Commission often refers to them and invokes them as proof of its actions.
- It should be noted, however, that these funding activities by the EU to tackle the migration crisis have created a **situation of contradicting public interests**. On the **one side**, there is the **need for flexible action** to meet urgent humanitarian and operational needs and on the **other side** there is the **override of the legislation and the audit** procedures. This is an “**instrumentalization**” of **EU funding** for immediate priorities, beyond the medium and long term objectives foreseen in the statutory texts of the various funding schemes employed, i.e. in the case of humanitarian assistance resources which were initially committed to be given to third countries, but they were eventually used to cover the needs of migrants in the EU.

- Thus, a **“monetisation” of legal and political issues regarding asylum and migration policies is being identified**. A very characteristic example is the **EU-Turkey “Statement”**, due to the problems that it causes with regard to its legal nature and its contents (especially considering Turkey’s poor record of adhering international law on respecting human life and dignity), as well as to its voluntary (on behalf of the EU) dependence of the successful implementation of a European policy regarding the migration crisis on the action of a third country, having as the most basic point the funding of this country by the EU. Taking into account the judicial development on the legal nature of the “Statement” (see above), which entails the conclusion that this is not even an act of the EU, there are serious concerns on the legality of providing funding to Turkey based on this particular “Statement” (**lack of legal basis**).
- **Establishing new funding instruments** to meet current needs under the pressure of these needs sets – as experience has shown – the **conditions of overriding the mechanisms of democratic control as well as financial control (audit)** for such instruments. If the inevitability of their establishment is verified and the existing instruments do not suffice to cover the needs, **the European Commission should take the necessary action** ie to undertake feasibility studies, impact assessments, ex ante evaluations etc **in order to establish the resulting added value for the EU** from the establishment of a new funding instrument as well as the adherence of the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
- In this direction, the European Parliament, through the discharge procedure (Art. 319 TFEU) and the European Court of Auditors must secure as much complete accountability and legality, regularity and sound financial management control as possible for the funding instruments.

- As for the 2021-2027 MFF, despite the above described arrangements, it is true that this scheme of the platforms has triggered **significant concerns**, such as:
 -
 - a) the impression(?) that EU states are shifting their responsibilities to third countries and externalising EU migration and asylum policies at all costs,
 - b) the idea that the scheme would lead to de facto or de jure “offshore processing centres of migrants”,
 - c) the fact that such post-disembarkation mechanisms require finding a Mediterranean third country that is actually safe and has adequate asylum legislation and procedures in place,
 - d) the legal implications for the EU and its Member States as regards their collaboration in the setting up and operation of such centres, given that their involvement could trigger the extraterritorial application of the jurisdiction of the ECHR, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the EU asylum acquis, thus making the EU and its Member States legally liable for what occurs in those centres, despite the fact that they are located outside their territory. Unless, of course, a repetition of the ...precedent of the EU-Turkey “Statement” is to be employed...
 - e) the return of migrants who are not found to have protection needs, given the practical and administrative difficulties to return people to their countries of origin, as this situation may keep unreturnable migrants living in limbo in sub-standard situations and further complicate potentially fragile socio-economic or political situations in the third country concerned.

Value for money?

- In the context of the **next Multiannual Financial Framework**, the European Council underlined the **need for flexible instruments**, allowing for fast disbursement, to combat illegal migration. The internal security, integrated border management, asylum and migration funds should therefore include dedicated, significant components for external migration management. Thus **more resources are to be expected for such policies**, at the expense of more traditional choices such as CAP or Cohesion (see above).
- Taking into account all the above reflections, it is obvious that the main concern facing the EU because of the migration/refugee crisis is **not only the amount of the resources made available and spent** by the EU budget for this issue, but also **whether these resources contribute substantively to the achievement of the objectives for which they are being committed and paid**.
- The findings of the European Court of Auditors demonstrate that in several occasions **value for money has not been achieved, or at least verified**.
- The EU can boast that **it has mobilised a substantive amount of resources**, both for the Member States involved, as well as for the third countries that play a significant role in managing the migratory flows towards the EU, however **the actual outcomes of this very expensive effort cannot be yet established**.
- The **variety of instruments** established demonstrate a extensive capacity and creativity on behalf of the Union and its Agencies in employing and committing large amounts of money in addressing multifaceted crises such as the migration/refugee crisis, however **the resulting reality is not as colourful**. After all, the success or failure is not going to be measured by the money spent but by the lives saved and given a viable opportunity for a new start.

Thank you for your attention!!!